Claim of FL Airlines Employee Barred by Going and Coming Statute
Construing Florida’s “going and coming” statute, § 440.092(2), Fla. Stat., a state appellate court affirmed a finding by a judge of compensation claims that injuries sustained by an American Airlines baggage handler as he walked from his work site through the public area of the Miami airport terminal toward a parking-lot-shuttle bus stop did not arise out of and in the course of the employment [Aquino v. American Airlines, 2022 Fla. App. LEXIS 1609 (1st DCA, Mar. 9, 2022)]. The court reasoned that the employer did not exercise actual dominion or control over the public area of the airport. The baggage handler’s injuries occurred after he had clocked out and left his work area. His claim was barred by the going and coming statute.
Background
Claimant worked as a baggage handler for American Airlines at the Miami airport. On the day of injury, he clocked out from his job for the day, walked through airport security to the upper level of the Miami airport terminal towards a parking-lot-shuttle bus stop, and then injured the calf muscle in his right leg stepping off a curb. Claimant reported the accident at work the next day and visited an on-site clinic. Ultimately, the employer denied the claim and the case proceeded to a hearing before a JCC, who concluded that Claimant could not recover due to the “going and coming” statute. Claimant appealed.
Two Parts of the Employer’s Premises?
On appeal, Claimant acknowledged that the going and coming statute generally precludes workers’ compensation coverage for injuries that occur when an employee commutes to and from work. He argued that the rule did not apply under the facts of his claim since he was traversing the ground between two parts of his employer’s premises—Claimant’s specific work site and the airport-employee parking lot where Claimant parked his car. Claimant further contended that the public areas of the Miami airport between his job site and the lot should have been considered part of the regularly used premises of his employer. And so, notwithstanding the going or coming statute, Claimant argued that his injury occurred on his employer’s premises and within the course and scope of his employment.
Actual Dominion or Control?
The appellate court indicated the key factor in premises-rule cases was whether the injury occurred in an area where the employer exercised “actual domination or control” [quoting Security Bureau, Inc. v. Alvarez, 654 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)]. The court examined Claimant’s key contention—that the airport-employee parking lot, where he was headed when injured, was part of his employer’s premises, which effectively made his regular path between the job site and parking lot part of his employer’s premises too. It noted, however, that the JCC determined that the employer exercised no actual domination or control over the airport-employee parking lot.
Moreover, Claimant’s injury occurred in a public area that served essentially as a public sidewalk, which wasn’t owned, leased, or maintained by the employer. The court reasoned that just because the employer’s employees traversed public areas of the airport and parked in a non-exclusive airport-employee parking lot, that did not convert those places to the employer’s premises. Since Claimant had left the employer’s premises, his claim was barred by the going and coming statute.