NJ Librarian’s Parking Lot Injuries When Struck by Snowplow are Compensable
Yesterday, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, reversing a decision of the Superior Court, Appellate Division [see 466 N.J. Super. 160, 245 A.3d 1019 (App. Div. 2021)], found that serious injuries sustained by a township librarian when she was struck by a snowplow in the parking lot adjacent to the library where she worked—she had clocked out for the day—nevertheless occurred in the course and scope of her employment [Lapsley v. Township of Sparta, 2022 N.J. LEXIS 61 (Jan. 18, 2022)]. The librarian, who had also filed a tort action against her employer and the snowplow driver—who also worked for the township—had contended that the parking lot was not part of her employer’s premises because, inter alia, it was available for public use. The high court said the employee’s focus was too narrow; there was sufficient evidence of control.
Background
Lapsley worked for the Township as a librarian at a public library. The library was located within a municipal complex that included athletic fields, offices, and three common-use parking lots. On the day of her injuries, Lapsley’s husband arrived at the library to driver her home. It was Winter and there was snow on the ground. As the couple walked from the library to the car through the parking lot, they were suddenly struck by a snowplow owned by the Township and operated by a Township employee. As a result, Lapsley suffered injuries to her leg requiring multiple surgeries and leaving her permanently disfigured. Lapsley filed a civil action against the Township and the driver in the Law Division and, later, a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against the Township in the Division of Workers’ Compensation.
Claim found Compensable; Appellate Division Reverses
The Division found that Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment and were, therefore, compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Lapsley appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, finding Lapsley’s injuries were not compensable under the Act. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted defendants’ petitions for certification.
Lapsley’s “Upside-Down” Allegation
Although the New Jersey high court did not use this terminology, the case essentially was what Arthur Larson referred to as an “upside-down” case in which the injured employee, in order to skirt around the exclusive remedy provisions of a state act, contends that his or her injuries were not sustained in the course and scope of the employment. Here Lapsley argued that that the parking lot was not part of the Township’s premises because it exercised no control over her route to or from the library and because the parking lot where she was injured was shared with the public. Lapsley further argues that if ownership and maintenance of the parking lot is sufficient to find compensability, the premises rule would be abrogated because the Township owned and maintained many properties and roadways within its boundaries, thus inviting expansive, unwarranted interpretations of the Act.
The Supreme Court noted that the Appellate Division had agreed with Lapsley’s arguments, in part relying upon the Court’s decision in Novis v. Rosenbluth Travel, 138 N.J. 92, 649 A.2d 69 (1994).
Supreme Court Construes “Premises Rule”
The high court indicated that in determining whether an accident arises out of and in the course of employment, New Jersey courts apply the premises rule, which essentially holds that an injury to an employee that happens going to or coming from work arises out of and in the course of employment if the injury takes place on the employer’s premises. That an employee may have clocked out, as was the case with Lapsley, was not determinative. According to the Court, the pivotal questions under the premises rule were:
- Where was the situs of the accident, and
- Did the employer have control of the property on which the accident occurred.
The Court noted that in Kristiansen v. Morgan, 153 N.J. 298, 708 A.2d 1173 (1998), it had stated that control exists when the employer owns, maintains, or has exclusive use of the property. Applying the premises rule, the Court found that Lapsley was entitled to compensation under the Act. Here, the site of the accident was the parking lot adjacent to the library where Lapsley’s husband had parked; Lapsley stepped off the library curb directly into the parking lot before being injured there. The Township controlled that parking lot through its ownership and maintenance.
Plowing Lot Showed Control
The Court added that the Township’s plowing of the parking lot of snow when the accident occurred visibly demonstrated the Township’s exercise of control over the lot. Moreover, the Township would have been aware that a library employee would park in the lot directly abutting the library. Based upon the foregoing, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and affirmed the findings of the Division of Workers’ Compensation. It did not refer to the pending tort action against the Township and the snowplow driver. It would certainly appear as if that action is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act.