Federal Court Dismisses Racially-Based IIED Suit Filed Against Co-Employee

A federal district court, construing Missouri law, dismissed a civil action filed by one employee against another alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) under Missouri common law, where the defendant employee admitted that he directed a racial slur to the plaintiff as the employees encountered each other in the employer’s break room [Coats v. Kraft Heinz Foods Co., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237473 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2021)]. Acknowledging that such racial slurs had no place in the work place, the district court nevertheless said Missouri law did not support NIED and IIED claims against a co-employee based on a single insulting incident. On related issues, the court also dismissed three of the plaintiff’s claims against the employer, Kraft Heinz—(1) negligent hiring, supervision, and/or retention; (2) NIED; and (3) IIED, finding that they were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Act.

Background

Plaintiff alleged that in June 2020, he was in a breakroom at the employer’s facility when the defendant/co-employee, a white employee, entered the breakroom and said “what’s up nigga.” Immediately after this incident, Plaintiff made a formal report alleging that he was being subjected to a hostile work environment. The defendant/co-employee admitted that he made the comment and was suspended for a period of three days, after which he returned to the workplace. Plaintiff believed that under Defendant Kraft Heinz’s policies, the co-employee should have been fired.

Plaintiff filed the instant civil action against Kraft Heinz and the co-employee alleging, inter alia, NIED, IIED, and negligent hiring and retention. Kraft Heins and the defendant/co-employee filed motions to dismiss.

Co-Employee’s Motion to Dismiss

As to the defendant/co-employee’s motion, the court noted that in order for Plaintiff to prevail on an IIED claim, he must show:

1. the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous,
2. the conduct was intentional or done recklessly, and
3. the conduct caused severe emotional distress that resulted in bodily harm.
4. the “sole purpose” of the defendant’s conduct must have been to cause extreme emotional distress.

The court observed that while the racial slur was reprehensible, under Missouri law the alleged conduct did not meet the definition of “extreme and outrageous,” since under Missouri law, for Plaintiff to meet this threshold the alleged conduct must be “so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community” [see Warrem v. Parrish, 436 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Mo. 1969). According to the district court, Missouri courts had found that “liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, or petty oppressions” [see Viehweg v. Vic Tanny Int'l of Mo., Inc., 732 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).

The court added that in addition, the Eighth Circuit has stated:

Liability for IIED clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someone's feelings are hurt [Bailey v. Bayer CropScience L.P., 563 F.3d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 2009)].

While reprehensible, the remark did not rise to the level necessary to support Plaintiff’s civil action against the defendant/co-employee.

Employer’s Motion to Dismiss

Similarly, the counts alleging negligent hiring and retention, IIED, and NIED could not stand against the employer, Kraft Heinz. Citing, inter alia, Hardebeck v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1065 (E.D. Mo. 2000), the court found the claims barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Act.