Florida’s Special Firefighter Cancer Statute Cannot Be Applied Retroactively

Florida’s special firefighter statute, § 112.1816, Fla. Stat., which provides previously unavailable benefits—a one-time payment of $25,000, and full coverage of the firefighter’s cancer treatment—to firefighters who meet certain criteria and are diagnosed with certain cancers, is a substantive change in Florida’s law, and as such applies only prospectively from its effective date (July 1, 2019), held a state appellate court in Weaver v. Volusia Cnty., 2022 Fla. App. LEXIS 7212 (1st DCA, Oct. 21, 2022). Accordingly, where the firefighter was diagnosed with ovarian cancer prior to the effective date, she did not qualify for the new statutory benefits.

Background

Weaver served as a full-time firefighter with Volusia County for 13 years before retiring in 2012. In 2017, she was diagnosed with ovarian cancer, which she attributed to her years of service as a firefighter. She did not, however, file for workers’ compensation benefits.

Following the passage of § 112.1816, Fla. Stat., Weaver asked the County to provide her with the statutory benefits. It declined her request, leading Weaver to file a declaratory action against the County seeking a declaration of her rights under the statute. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing that the statute applied only prospectively and, therefore, did not apply to Weaver. The trial court agreed, finding the statute “creates a new substantive right, is not remedial in nature, and does not apply retroactively to cancer diagnoses occurring prior to its effective date of July 1, 2019.” Weaver appealed.

Can the Statute be Applied Retroactively

The appellate court initially noted that prior to the enactment of § 112.1816, Fla. Stat., a firefighter who was diagnosed with cancer and believed the disease was caused by the employment could only seek benefits from the employer by filing a workers’ compensation claim. To receive benefits under chapter 440, the firefighter had to make several showings, including a showing that the cancer was caused by the work. The appellate court noted that the passage of the alternative remedy, § 112.1816, took effect more than two years after Weaver’s diagnosis.

Turning to the issue of retroactivity, the court said that it firsts had to decide if the statute was substantive or, as Weaver argues on appeal, procedural/remedial in nature. Citing existing case law, the court said that a substantive law prescribes legal duties and rights, whereas a procedural/remedial law, on the other hand, did not create new or take away vested rights, but rather only operated in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. If the statute was substantive, then it is presumed to apply prospectively. If, on the other hand, the statute is procedural/remedial, then the presumption against retroactivity does not take effect, thereby allowing, in most situations, the statute to be applied to pending cases in order to fully effectuate the legislation’s intended purpose.

Statute Provided a “New” Benefit

Weaver contended that § 112.1816, Fla. Stat., fell within the procedural/remedial category because it created a new remedy as evidenced by its statement that it is an “alternative to pursuing workers’ compensation benefits under chapter 440.” As such, she argued that the statute unambiguously defined itself as an alternate path to benefits firefighters already had a substantive right to pursue through the workers’ compensation system [emphasis added].

The court stressed, however, that Weaver’s argument missed the mark. The statute did not simply alter the means by which firefighters obtain already-existing workers’ compensation benefits. To the contrary, the statute carved out a limited class of firefighters and provided them with benefits that were previously unavailable to them, all while relieving that class of firefighters of the obligations associated with receiving benefits under chapter 440. This, said the court, was a substantive change in law.

Statute Saddled Employers With New Obligations

The court rejected Weaver’s argument that the statute was remedial because it merely eased the requirements for a limited class of firefighters diagnosed with cancer to get additional benefits. What Weaver failed to see was the fact that the statutory “remedy” was effectuated by imposing new legal burdens on employers, further supporting a conclusion that the statutory amendment was more appropriately characterized as substantive in nature.

Here, it should be noted that the cost of all the benefits provided by the statute are borne solely by the employer and not by the employer’s workers’ compensation carrier [§ 112.1816(5), Fla. Stat.]. The court stressed that even if the statute was intended to serve a remedial purpose, the fact that it did so by creating new rights for a limited class and new obligations for employers required the court to treat it as a substantive law.

The court concluded, therefore, that § 112.1816, Fla. Stat., was not retroactive. The trial court’s order granting the County summary judgment was affirmed.