Kansas Court Says Dual Capacity Doctrine Not Applicable Where Employer Manufactured Machine Causing Employee’s Injury

Observing that in Kansas, like a number of other states, an employer may be liable in tort as a “third-party tortfeasor” if the employer has obligations to the employee independent of those imposed on it as an employer, the Court of Appeals of Kansas nevertheless affirmed the granting of summary judgment favoring the defendant/employer in a negligence action filed by an employee who sustained injuries while operating a press machine that had been designed and manufactured by his employer [Jefferies v. United Rotary Brush Corp., 2022 Kan. App. LEXIS 27 (July 1, 2022). The Court stressed that the dual capacity doctrine, a judicially recognized exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the state’s Workers’ Compensation Act, did not apply when a machine manufactured by the employer injures the employee since the employer has a duty to its employees to maintain a safe work environment.

Background

Jeffries filed a civil action against his employer and five related entities alleging that he sustained injuries when he tried to dislodge a “brush wafer” from a press machine. As he attempted to clear the machine, it activated, crushing his left arm and hand. He sued for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability based on the design and manufacture of the machine.

Jeffries and the employer disputed when the press machine had been manufactured. Jeffries contended that date was before a merger of multiple companies in which the employer was the surviving corporate entity. The employer contended that the machine had been manufactured after the merger. The trial court said the issue was immaterial since the employer had been the surviving entity. The trial court then granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant/employer.

Appellate Court Affirms

The appellate court noted that Kansas courts had interpreted K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 44-501b(d)—the state’s exclusive remedy statute—to mean that an injured employee cannot maintain a civil action against his or her employer or another employee for damages based on common-law negligence if that injured employee could have recovered compensation for their injury under the Workers Compensation Act [citing Hawkins v. Southwest Kansas Co-op Svc., 313 Kan. 100, 103, 484 P.3d 236 (2021). The court added that one exception to the exclusive remedy provision, permitting civil claims against the employer, was the dual capacity doctrine, first recognized in Kansas in Kimzey v. Interpace Corp., 10 Kan. App. 2d 165, 166-67, 694 P.2d 907 (1985).

The appellate court added that there were only two Kansas cases in which an injured employee tried to use the dual capacity doctrine in Kimzey to avoid the exclusive remedy provision. In both cases, the court declined to apply the doctrine [see Scott v. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp., 23 Kan. App. 2d 156, 157-58, 161-62, 928 P.2d 109 (1996) (declining to apply the doctrine to confer tort liability on employer and physician's assistants employer hired to treat employees when physician’s assistants negligently treated employee for non-work-related injury); Hill v. Wenger Mfg., No. 71,288, 1995 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 206, (Kan. App. 1995), declining to extend doctrine to employer-manufactured product intended for sale to the public). Thus, to date, said the court, no Kansas court had extended the dual capacity doctrine to any factual situation other than that presented in Kimzey.

The court explored, in some detail, the merger of the various entities that resulted in the employer firm being the surviving corporation. It found that the parties had not intended the post-merger employer to be a new entity. Jeffries’ reliance on assumption of liabilities language in the merger agreement was unavailing, since it was overstated. The appellate court then concluded:

It was undisputed that URBC manufactured the convoluted press. The district court correctly concluded the factual dispute about when the subject press machine was manufactured was immaterial. There was thus no genuine dispute as to any material fact and URBC was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law: Under Kimzey, the dual capacity doctrine does not apply because Jefferies' employer manufactured the machine. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to URBC [Opinion, p. 24].

For extensive discussion of the history and applicability of the dual capacity doctrine, see Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 113.01, et seq.