Iowa Court Affirms Denial of Death Benefits in Suicide Case
An Iowa appellate court affirmed a district court’s decision affirming the denial of death benefits to a widow whose husband committed suicide mere hours after he had been terminated from a job that he’d held for 28 years [Jackson v. Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, 2021 Iowa App. LEXIS 1045 (Dec. 15, 2021)]. Acknowledging that there was some connection between the firing and the suicide, the appellate court stressed that showing a connection was insufficient. The suicide must be factually and legally caused by a compensable injury, held the court. The widow here had failed to show that her husband had been subjected to unusual levels of stress in his work.
Background
Jackson began working for the employer in the late 1980s. Evidence presented to an Iowa deputy commissioner suggested that Jackson’s job was extremely important to him; in 28 years, he had missed only three days of work.
Jackson was fired in August 2016 for insubordination. Essentially, evidence indicated Jackson disobeyed supervisory directives concerning safety and quality. The employer’s representatives also found that Jackson had lied about those acts. He was initially suspended, but terminated after a “cooling-off period.” Hours later, Jackson committed suicide—hanging himself at a bridge near his home.
Possible Mental Disorder
Evidence later indicated that Jackson had a history of substance abuse but had been sober for several years. Roughly eight months prior to the termination and suicide, he underwent a behavioral health consultation and was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. In his initial consult, Jackson reported hating people, listing various individuals, including his wife, a neighbor, and a dentist, but not anyone from his place of employment. He was recommended to attend psychotherapy and did, but he declined a referral for psychiatric treatment. He underwent an initial social history assessment later that month, at which he presented issues with anger and rage. He was additionally diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder. Jackson was discharged from treatment due to scheduling issues with his provider, but the counselor recommended he continue therapy. There was no evidence in the record
that Jackson sought any further treatment for his diagnoses.
Death Benefits Sought
In January 2018, Jackson’s widow sought workers’ compensation death benefits. She solicited an opinion from Dr. James Gallagher on the issue of whether her husband’s suicide was causally linked to his employment. Gallagher opined that there appeared to be a causative linkage between the behavior of his employer and Jackson’s swift decision to end his own life, probably out of fear and shame of losing his job. He added that Jackson clearly considered the loss of his job as catastrophic.
Deputy Commissioner Denies Claim
A deputy commissioner found that Jackson’s ongoing mental conditions appeared to have been rooted in personal issues outside his employment, that work was Jackson’s place of solace, that Jackson’s fear of termination and psychological pain resulting therefrom were not injuries arising in the course of employment, and that the punishment fit the insubordinate acts. Because the punishment was appropriate, the deputy commissioner found Jackson’s mental condition and suicide were not causally related to his termination. More succinctly, the deputy commissioner found the suicide could not be traced to an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.
Commissioner and District Court Affirm
Jackson’s widow appealed to the commissioner, who affirmed. The widow then sought judicial review in the district court. The district court also affirmed, finding that Dr. Gallagher’s opinion was based on incomplete information. The court concluded the evidence was insufficient to show any mental injury was related to stress from the job; factual causation was therefore lacking. The court also found legal causation lacking based on the absence of evidence that Jackson was treated differently than other insubordinate employees and thereby subjected to unusual job stress.
Appellate Court Affirms
Initially, the appellate court noted that an Iowa claimant could recover from a mental injury without an accompanying physical injury, at least under certain circumstances. To qualify as a compensable personal injury, a claimant must prove both factual causation and legal causation. Here, the widow conceded that the suicide itself could not be such a compensable injury; she argued that the suicide had been caused by a mental injury arising out of and in the course of Jackson’s employment.
Factual Causation
The court acknowledged that Dr. Gallagher had opined that there appeared to be a causative link between the behavior of Jackson’s employer and Jackson’s swift decision to end his own life. The appellate court said, however, that the district court was correct that Dr. Gallagher’s opinion was based on incomplete information and did not contemplate Jackson’s repeated and blatant insubordination, the fact that company policy mandated termination for such an infraction without the possibility of progressive discipline, and that the policy had been followed in the past as to other insubordinate employees. As such, the appellate court said the agency was within its authority to give little weight to Dr. Gallagher’s opinion.
Legal Causation
As to legal causation, the court stressed that Jackson’s widow was required to show that his mental injury was caused by workplace stress of greater magnitude than the day-to-day mental stresses experienced by other workers employed in the same or similar jobs, regardless of their employer. Unfortunately, said the court, the widow had presented no evidence that her husband’s resulting stress was of greater magnitude than the mental stress experienced by other workers in the same or similar jobs that were terminated for insubordination, either as to so-called average workers or long-time and dedicated union workers such as Jackson.
According to the court, the evidence did not show that Jackson was subjected to on-the-job “unusual stress” tethering the alleged injury to his employment. Absent evidence offering a comparison of the stress endured by similarly situated employees, the court had to agree that Jackson’s widow failed to meet her burden on the issue of legal causation.
Comment
Those readers who utilize a “but-for” analysis in judging the compensability of a claim may be put off by the Iowa court’s decision. There was a clear and strong connection here between Jackson’s termination and his suicide. But, as the court noted, that isn’t the standard. We tend to judge these suicide cases utilizing an “unbroken-chain-of-causation” standard. And in this situation, that standard seems to have been met. In reality, however, that isn’t the case.
The “unbroken-chain-of-causation” standard requires some sort of initial compensable injury. For example, in the typical situation, the worker suffers a devastating injury, endures unimaginable pain, and to end that pain, he or she commits suicide. The suicide there can be linked to the original compensable injury.
Here, the situation was entirely different. As the widow admitted, Jackson’s suicide, standing alone, could not be compensable. It had to be linked to some sort of workplace injury. The termination here was not such an injury. It was not an injury for two reasons:
- Iowa requires the mental injury to be the result of some sort of extraordinary or unusual stress. Jackson’s widow presented no compelling evidence that his being fired for insubordination was the sort of unusual stress that could support a mental injury claim.
- The deputy commissioner, the commissioner reviewing the decision, and the district court all could not ignore the other psychological factors that appeared to be active in Jackson’s life. At the time of Jackson’s suicide, he appeared already to be a deeply disturbed individual.
Contrary to our desire to see compensation paid where there is a strong connection between a workplace event and the death of a worker, we must nevertheless require that the claimant establish that the death arose out of the employment and not out of the sad demons that reside in the minds of many in our country who are psychologically ill.