Delaware Worker’s Running in Workplace Bars Claim for Injuries
Construing 19 Del. C. § 2353(b), which bars an employee’s right to compensation for an injury if the injury results, inter alia, from “the employee’s deliberate and reckless indifference to danger,” a Delaware appellate court affirmed the state Board’s denial of workers’ compensation benefits to a claimant whom the Board found was injured while running inside the employer’s plant, when he had been told on multiple occasions not to do so and, in fact, had been disciplined in the past for running [Pierre v. Perdue Farms, 2021 Del. Super. LEXIS 544 (Aug. 12, 2021). The court noted that the Board found the injured employee’s actions had not been instinctive or thoughtless, as described in Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law (“Larson”), § 34.02, et seq., but rather had been deliberate. Substantial evidence supported the Board’s decision, said the appellate court.
Background
In late May 2019, the claimant sustained injuries to his face from colliding with a metal pole or bar in his workplace. The employer disputed the compensability of the injury, asserting a forfeiture defense pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 2353(b). The parties agreed to bifurcate the proceedings, holding one hearing regarding the compensability issue and another, if needed, to address medical issues.
At the hearing, the claimant testified that he had been asked by his line leader to check boxes that were coming down the line empty. The claimant asserted that he was walking fast—not running—and that he hit his face on a pole while completing the task. A co-worker, who worked as a team leader, testified that she saw the claimant “sprint” past her and told him, to hold up and stop. She testified that the claimant did not hear her and thereafter slipped, fell forward, hit his face on a steel bar, fell to the ground, and was knocked upright by the force of the impact.
Other evidence was introduced to show that the employer held regular safety meetings, that at these meetings, the employer communicated to the workers that running within the workplace was prohibited, and that the claimant had been disciplined for running in the plant in 2012. The Board found that the claimant had forfeited his right to compensation because his action of running, when he had been told not to run, represented deliberate and reckless indifference to danger. The Board found the co-worker’s testimony more credible than the claimant’s reasoning that the co-worker’s testimony that the claimant was running at the time of the injury was consistent with the extent and nature of his injuries. The claimant appealed.
Appellate Court Decision
The appellate court indicated that, on appeal, the claimant relied heavily on Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 34.02, et seq., and in particular the treatise’s observation that in a number of decisions from various jurisdictions, the intentional and deliberate defense has been rejected because the injured employee’s action, although prohibited, was instinctive or thoughtless, rather than intentional and deliberate.
The court indicated, however, that the claimant’s citations to Larson were of limited value in that he had failed to provide citations to any of the cases to which Larson had cited. Moreover, said the court, the claimant had not been detailed the facts of any of those cases in order that the court might determine how they aligned with, or differed from, those of the instant case. Nor had the claimant provided the court with any specific language of the statutory provisions that those decisions were construing.
Credibility a Key
The court noted that the Board had been presented with extensive testimony that the claimant’s conduct was deliberate, not instinctive or thoughtless:
- The claimant admitted that he knew that running in the plant was a safety violation;
- The co-worker testified that prior to the incident, the claimant had been repeatedly told, both in group settings and individually, that running was a safety violation;
- According to the co-worker, despite this knowledge and these warnings, the claimant was not just running, but “sprinting,” through the plant.
Moreover, said the court, there was no affirmative evidence before the Board that the claimant’s conduct was instinctive or thoughtless. The court observed that the claimant never testified that he was heedlessly or thoughtlessly running through the plant, but instead testified that he was not running, while the co-worker, whom the Board found to be more credible, testified that the claimant was running.
Considering the plain meaning of the statutory language, the appellate court could not conclude that the Board committed legal error when it determined that the claimant, despite knowing that running was a serious safety violation, demonstrated “deliberate and reckless indifference to danger” by sprinting through the plant and exposing himself to injury. Substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the claimant’s injuries were not compensable.