KY Supreme Court Construes Agricultural Employee Exemption

The Supreme Court of Kentucky, construing the state’s agricultural employee exemption [see Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 342.650(5) and 342.0011(18)], reversed a split decision of the state’s Court of Appeals and held a claimant was not entitled to worker’s compensation benefits under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 342, because she was a person employed in agriculture [Brownwood Prop., LLC v. Thornton, 2021 Ky. LEXIS 128 (Apr. 29, 2021)]. While the fact that the employer was engaged solely in agriculture on farmland that was used solely for an agricultural purposes was not dispositive, the Court stressed that when the employer purchased the farm, it had to restore the farm in order that it function again as a fully functioning horse farm. All of the claimant’s work, whether mowing or cleaning, was performed as part of the overall effort of all of the employees to restore the farm, and was incident to or in conjunction with the farm's operations.

Background

Claimant dislocated her foot when fell as she was getting out of a truck on the employer’s property. She was immediately taken to the hospital where her foot was set, and surgery was performed less than a week later. Unfortunately, her bones were reset incorrectly during surgery, causing her foot to be “obviously misshapen” after the cast was removed. Her toes were deformed and she was unable to place weight on her foot in an appropriate manner. Various treatments were attempted to correct the condition, but after three months, claimant’s treating physicians advised her that she had two choices: (a) they could either surgically re-break her foot and attempt to reset it properly, or (b) they could amputate her extremity at mid-calf. She chose the latter and was fitted with a prosthesis.

Claimant filed a workers’ compensation claim. Because the employer was uninsured, the Uninsured Employers’ Fund (UEF) was joined as a defendant. The employer contended that there was no workers’ compensation coverage since it was an employer solely engaged in agriculture under KRS3 342.630(1) and claimant was a person employed in agriculture under KRS 342.650(5), The ALJ agreed, dismissing the claim.

Claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board (the Board), which affirmed the ALJ’s finding that the employer was an agricultural employer, but reversed the finding that the claimant was an agricultural employee. The Court of Appeals upheld the Board’s decision and the employer appealed.

Supreme Court’s Decision

Initially, the state Supreme Court observed that pursuant to KRS3 342.630(1), an employer engaged solely in agriculture is not subject to the requirements of Chapter 342, including the purchase of workers’ compensation insurance to cover its employees in the event they are injured. Here, the parties did not dispute that the employer was engaged solely in agriculture at the time of claimant’s injury. The question was whether claimant was a person employed in agriculture at the time of her injury.

Construing KRS 342.650(5), the Court observed that agricultural work included “any work performed as an incident to or in conjunction with the farm operations” [KRS 342.650(5)]. The Court stressed that, contrary to the employer’s contention, once an employer was determined to be exempt under KRS3 342.630(1), that did not necessarily mean that all its employees were considered agricultural employees.

The Court did agree, however, with the employer’s other contention: that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that claimant’s employment was not agricultural. The Board had held that claimant was not an agricultural employee because “she was not primarily engaged in agricultural activities” and that she “was not employed to regularly perform tasks typically considered agricultural in nature.”

Definition of Agriculture Was Intentionally Board

The Court stressed, however, that the definition of agriculture was intentionally broad. It was necessary to look at the “whole character” of an individual’s employment to determine whether the person was employed in agriculture. Here, it was undisputed that when the employer purchased the farm, it had to be restored before it could return to being a fully functioning horse farm. The Court said that all of claimant’s work was performed as part of the overall effort of all of the employer’s employees to restore the farm. Whether claimant was mowing or cleaning, her work was incidental to or in conjunction with the farm’s operations.

The Court said it agreed with the dissent from the decision of the Court of Appeals. Considering the “whole character” of the claimant’s work for the employer, that work fell within the meaning of KRS 342.650(5) and KRS 342.0011(18), and she was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits under Chapter 342.