Illinois Court Tacitly Says No Recovery Since Injury Was Claimant’s Fault
An Illinois appellate court affirmed the denial of workers’ compensation benefits to a university employee who sustained injuries when she tripped and fell as she stepped over a chain barrier near the university’s personnel building, where the employee had intended to turn in her time card [Purcell v. Illinois Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 2021 IL App (4th) 200359WC, 2021 Ill. App. LEXIS 206 (Apr. 27, 2021)]. Citing the state’s 1999 Dodson decision, the appellate court agreed with the Commission that the employee failed to prove that her accident arose out of her employment since she had “voluntarily hopped over the chain fence when the heel of her shoe got caught and she was injured” [Opinion, p. 11]. Her decision, said the court, “exposed her to an unnecessary danger entirely separate from her employment responsibilities” [Opinion, pp. 11-12]. The lesson here for both employers and employees in the state: minor deviations can defeat a claim.
Background
The claimant was employed as an administrative assistant on a temporary or “extra help” basis. She worked from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, and she was paid for 7.5 hours per day. Her job required her to leave her office located in the undergraduate library on a daily basis to perform various duties around campus. When the claimant had to go to other campus buildings, she would generally walk, but would also take the bus. As a temporary employee, she was required to turn in a time card at the university’s personnel office every other Friday.
On the day of her injury, she took the bus to campus and arrived at approximately 8:20 a.m. The claimant testified that she intended to turn in her time card at the personnel building before proceeding to her own building to begin her work. As she approached the personnel building, she also approached a chain barrier/fence. She attempted to hop over it, but the heel of her shoe got caught, and she fell onto her right elbow. The claimant was taken by ambulance to a nearby medical center, and she ultimately had surgery on her right elbow.
Arbitrator’s Decision Affirmed by Commission
The arbitrator analyzed the claimant’s case under a traveling-employee framework and concluded that the claimant failed to establish that she was a traveling employee. The Commission affirmed the arbitrator’s decision with changes. The Commission disagreed with the arbitrator’s finding that the claimant was not acting in the course of her employment at the time of the accident in as much as the claimant was injured on the University’s premises within a reasonable time period before commencing her job duties. However, the Commission agreed that the claimant failed to prove that the accident arose out of her employment. The circuit court subsequently confirmed the Commission’s findings.
Appellate Court’s Analysis
The appellate court first discussed the issue of whether the claimant had satisfied the “arising out of” requirement for a non-traveling employee. The court indicated that if it answered that question in the negative, it would move on to the question of whether the claimant could establish her claim under the traveling employee doctrine.
Observing that the “arising out of” requirement was concerned with causal connection between the injury and the employment, the court indicated that generally, the claimant must show that the injury had its origin in some risk connected with, or incidental to, her employment so as to create a causal connection between her injury and employment. The court added that here, the claimant argued that the act that caused her injury—hopping over a chain barrier along a sidewalk on her way to drop off her time card—was an act the university might reasonably expect her to perform to fulfill her duties as a temporary employee who was required to drop off her time card.
Dodson Decision
The appellate court stressed that the Commission’s reliance on an earlier decision, Dodson v. Industrial Comm’n, 308 Ill. App. 3d 572 (1999), was appropriate. In Dodson, the employee exited her employer’s premises through an employee exit. She proceeded down several steps of a concrete sidewalk leading to the employee’s parking area and, because it was raining hard, she left the sidewalk and walked across a grassy slope to reach the driver’s side of her car. She later testified that she left the sidewalk because it was the most direct route to her car. Unfortunately, she slipped on the grassy slope and was injured. On appeal, the appellate court found that the claimant’s voluntary decision to traverse the grassy slope, instead of the walkway, exposed her to an unnecessary danger entirely separate from her employment responsibilities. Further, it was the claimant’s decision not to use the walkway, which was for her own benefit, and not that of her employer. Thus, said the Dodson curt, the claimant’s injuries did not arise out of her employment.
She Shouldn’t Have Hopped Over the Chain, Said the Court
Applying Dodson to the claimant’s case, the appellate court stressed that the claimant voluntarily hopped over the chain fence when the heel of her shoe got caught and she was injured. The court continued:
This decision exposed her to an unnecessary danger entirely separate from her employment responsibilities. The claimant did not assert that her decision to hop over the chain fence was to avoid any defect or obstruction. Additionally, her decision not to use the walkway, which she testified would have been safer and only taken an extra few seconds, was for her own benefit and not to the benefit of the University. An injury does not arise out of employment where an employee voluntarily exposes herself to an unnecessary personal danger solely for her own convenience [Opinion, pp. 11-12]
Court Quickly Dispatched “Traveling Employee” and “Street Risk Doctrines”
The court went on to dispatch two other theories of compensability: (a) that the claimant was a traveling employee and should, therefore, enjoy broader protections, and (b) that the risks of the street were part of the risks that she faced as an employee at the university. The appellate court accordingly affirmed the judgment of the circuit court which had, in turn, confirmed the Commission’s decision.
Comment: Court Not So Subtly Inserted Fault as an Element of the Claim
In my less than humble opinion, the court got it wrong, both in the 1999 Dodson decision and in this case which, of course, is based upon, and quite similar factually to Dodson. Essentially what the court says here is that the employee was at fault in causing her injury. Yet fault, neither on the part of the employee nor the employer is generally supposed to be an issue in workers’ compensation law [see the extended discussion in Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 32.01, et seq.]. Ignoring fault is part of the workers’ compensation bargain.
To be sure, a true deviation from the employment can remove the accident and, therefore, the injury from the employment [see the extended discussion in Larson, § 17.01, et seq.]. Technically speaking, an employee isn’t furthering the employer’s business, for example, when he or she visits a rest room. Long ago, however, courts determined that to say that an employee stepped in and then out of the employment numerous times each day when attending to one’s personal comfort, when whiling away during temporary downtimes, and when taking unimportant shortcuts, would make for an impossible rule. In most jurisdictions, an insubstantial deviation is not sufficient to disqualify the employee from recovering benefits. In Illinois, apparently, that is not the rule.
In Illinois, does one remove oneself from the employment by driving 56 mph in a 55 mph zone? Does a warehouse employee remove himself or herself from the employment when he or she attempts to lift a heavy object alone rather than call for help? In each situation, the employee “decides” to take a specific course of activity that isn’t sanctioned by the employer. Understand, if Illinois courts want to enforce a rule that says even minor deviations take the employee out of the employment, those courts are certainly entitled to do so. Having done so, as is the case in Dodson and the instant case, however, Illinois courts shouldn’t be deluded into thinking that the courts’ decisions are within the mainstream of judicial thought.