NY High Court Says Claimant’s Estate Due Only Portion of Posthumous SLU Award
The Court of Appeals of New York, construing N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 15(4)(d), which generally limits recovery by a claimant’s estate to an amount not exceeding reasonable funeral expenses when a claimant found entitled to permanent partial disabilities dies of causes unrelated to the work injuries without a surviving spouse, a child under the age of 18, or a qualifying dependent, held a claimant’s estate was not entitled to recover the full value of a posthumous schedule loss of use (SLU) award in a lump sum, but rather only that portion of the SLU award that would have been due to the claimant for the period prior to the claimant’s death, plus reasonable funeral expenses [Matter of Estate of Youngjohn v. Berry Plastics Corp., 2021 N.Y. LEXIS 547 (Apr. 1, 2021)]. Affirming an earlier decision of the Appellate Division, the Court effectively reversed a Board decision that had limited recover in the case to reasonable funeral expenses.
Background
Claimant sustained injuries when he slipped on ice and fell in a parking lot at work while employed by the employer. His claim for workers’ compensation benefits was established for injuries to his right shoulder and left elbow, and claimant was awarded temporary benefits. In September 2016, claimant notified the Board that his injuries had become permanent, and the employer’s carrier subsequently notified the Board that claimant’s injuries were amenable to a schedule loss of use award (SLU).
In March 2017, however, before resolution of his claim for PPD benefits, claimant suffered a fatal heart attack unassociated with his work-related injuries. At the time of his death, decedent had no surviving spouse, minor children, or other qualifying dependents as defined by the applicable statutes.
Estate Contended Entire SLU Award Owed
Following decedent’s death, the workers’ compensation proceedings were continued through decedent’s estate. The Estate and the carrier stipulated to a 55 percent SLU of decedent’s left arm, a 45 percent SLU of his right arm, and 23 weeks of protracted healing. A dispute arose, however, regarding whether the Estate was entitled to the full value of the SLU award or only the portion of the award up to the date of decedent’s death, with the remainder of the award capped in accordance with N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 15(4)(d). The Estate argued that, in light of the legislature’s 2009 amendments to the Workers Compensation Law authorizing lump sum SLU awards, the entirety of decedent’s award accrued at the time of decedent’s accident or death. According to the Estate, the 2009 amendments effectively rendered N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 15(4)(d) inapplicable to SLU awards, and the full value of the award was, therefore, payable to the Estate.
WCLJ & Board Render Decisions
The WCLJ essentially agreed with the Estate, finding that the decedent was entitled to 312 weeks of benefits, plus an additional 23.8 weeks due to the protracted healing period. The WCLJ, therefore, directed that the total SLU award of $206,352.26, less payments already made, be paid to the Estate in a lump sum because liability for the SLU accrued prior to the date of death. The Board, applying N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 15(4)(d), modified the WCLJ’s decision, determining that the SLU award payable to the Estate was limited solely to the amount of the award capped at reasonable funeral expenses. The Estate appealed to the Appellate Division.
Third Department’s Decision
The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed so much of the Board’s decision as limited the SLU award to reasonable funeral expenses, determining that the Estate was entitled to payment of that portion of the SLU award that was due up to the date of decedent’s death [see Matter of Estate of Youngjohn v. Berry Plastics Corp., 169 A.D.3d 1237, 94 N.Y. S.3d 396 (2019)], remitted the matter to the Board for calculation of the award, and otherwise affirmed.
The Appellate Division concluded that although N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 15(4)(d) restricted payment of the unaccrued portion of the SLU award to reasonable funeral expenses, the Estate was nevertheless owed, pursuant to N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 33, that portion of the SLU award that would have been periodically due between the date of the injury and the date of decedent’s death. The Appellate Division also observed that the amendments did not otherwise alter the rate at which an SLU award accrued to an injured employee who was posthumously awarded SLU benefits. The Court of Appeals granted the Estate leave to appeal.
Court of Appeals Affirms
Initially, the Court indicated workers’ compensation benefits were allowed for four different types of injury:
- Permanent total disability
- Temporary total disability
- Permanent partial disability, and
- Temporary partial disability.
In the case of PTD, TTD, or TPD, an employee was to be awarded compensation “during the continuance of the disability” based on a percentage of the employee’s wages (see Matter of LaCroix v. Syracuse Exec. Air Serv., Inc., 8 NY3d 348, 866 N.E.2d 1004, 834 N.Y.S.2d 676 (2007)]. With respect to PPDs, SLU awards were issued for such disabilities that involved a body part specifically enumerated in N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 15(a) through (t).
Section 33
The Court noted that, pursuant to N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 33, any compensation that was due at the time of the employee’s death was to be payable to his or her surviving spouse, minor child, or certain dependents and, if there were none, then to the claimant’s estate.
Section 15(4)(d)
The Court stressed that to accept the Estate’s argument that the entire SLU award became “due” to the claimant at or prior to his death, would be to hold that the legislature implicitly rendered N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 15(4)(d) completely inapplicable to SLU awards, leaving that provision effectual—if at all—with respect only to non-schedule partial permanent disability awards. Contrary to the contention of Justice Rivera, who specially concurred with the decision, no such legislative intent could be discerned from either the text of section 15(4)(d), the statutory language enacted in 2009, or the legislative history of the 2009 amendments.
The Court concluded that N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 15(4)(d) should be interpreted in the same manner as it was before the 2009 amendments. The Court said that If the legislature intended for a claimant’s estate to recover the full value of an SLU award under the circumstances presented here, the Workers’ Compensation Law would have to be amended to so provide. The Court, however, was bound to reconcile the 2009 amendments with section 15(4)(d), which could be achieved in such a manner as to give full effect to the plain language of each statutory provision.