Original TN Employer Liable for Medical Care in Spite of Employee’s Violation of Lifting Limits
Negligent post-injury conduct, such as exceeding the lifting restrictions placed on an injured employee’s activity cannot, in and of itself, constitute an independent intervening cause that would relieve the original employer from liability for continued workers’ compensation benefits, held an appeals panel of the Supreme Court of Tennessee [Paris v. McKee Foods Corp., 2021 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (Feb. 16, 2021), aff’d, adopted, 2021 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (Feb. 16, 2021)]. Quoting Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, the panel accordingly held that where a worker exceeded her lifting restrictions, resulting in significant pain—but no new injury and no actual aggravation of the original injury—the original employer remained liable for medical treatment associated with that pain under the direct and natural consequences rule.
Background
In 2005, Paris injured her left wrist in the course and scope of her employment with McKee Foods (“McKee”). During the course of her treatment, she underwent multiple surgeries. In June 2009, one of her surgeons determined that she was at MMI, assigning Paris with a three percent impairment of the left upper extremity. Paris underwent a functional capacity evaluation (FCE), after which the surgeon placed various lifting restrictions on her. In September 2009, Paris and McKee settled the outstanding workers’ compensation claim. Under the settlement agreement, McKee agreed to pay, inter alia, all “reasonable and necessary authorized future medical expenses which are directly related to the subject injury.”
Paris subsequently left her employment with McKee, initially going to work for Amazon, and later for T.R. Moore (“Moore”). In December 2012, while working for Amazon, Paris experienced pain in her left wrist while lifting a tote that weighed 29 pounds (she was restricted to lifting 25 pounds occasionally). In July 2015, while working for Moore, she experienced pain while lifting roadway signs that weighed 45 to 50 pounds each.
On various occasions during the relevant time period, Paris sought treatment with her surgeon for pain associated with the described incidents. McKee objected to paying the charges, contending that Paris had negligently violated her FCE restrictions, both at Amazon and while working for Moore. The trial court agreed, finding that Paris’s negligence “broke the chain of causation from the initial McKee injury,” thereby relieving McKee of liability for her medical treatment. The trial court centered in on a statement made by Paris at an ER (she apparently told the ER staff that it felt like her wrist might break. Based on that statement, the trial court said there had been a “different event.” Paris appealed.
Appellate Court Decision
Initially, the appellate court noted that the trial court did not find that Paris suffered a new injury in either the Amazon or Moore lifting incident. The trial court held, however, that there was an intervening and independent cause because Paris negligently exceeded the FCE lifting restrictions she was under as a result of the original McKee wrist injury. Summarizing Paris’s argument, the appellate court said she contended that there could be no finding of an independent and intervening cause absent a finding of a new and distinct injury or at least an aggravation of the original injury. The appellate court agreed.
Quoting Larson, the court noted that Tennessee followed the majority rule as to consequential or subsequent injuries:
When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment [Larson, § 10.01].
The court also noted, however, that the direct and natural consequences rule had its limits. The original employer is not liable for a subsequent injury that is the result of an independent intervening cause, such as the employee’s own conduct. Here, said the appellate court, the trial court held that Paris acted negligently by transgressing the FCE lifting restrictions while working at Amazon and Moore, and that her actions constituted an independent intervening cause.
Trial Court Said There Was No Second Injury
Paris essentially argued that, even if she exceeded the work restrictions and did so negligently, there was no independent intervening cause because the Amazon and Moore incidents did not result in a new injury or an aggravation of her original McKee wrist injury. The appellate court stressed that, indeed, in its ruling in response to Paris’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, the trial court stated specifically that neither the Amazon nor the Moore incident resulted in a “second injury.”
Pain is Not a Second Injury
Citing Trosper v. Armstrong Wood Prods., Inc., 273 S.W.3d 598, 607 (Tenn. 2008), the appellate court stressed that an employee does not suffer a compensable injury where the work activity aggravates the pre-existing condition merely by increasing the pain. If the work activity advances the severity of the pre-existing condition, or if, as a result of the pre-existing condition, the employee suffers a new, distinct injury other than increased pain, then it constitutes a compensable work injury.
No Issue of “Clean Hands”
The appellate court said the evidence in the record preponderated in favor of the trial court’s holding that Paris did not suffer a new injury from either the 2012 Amazon incident or the 2015 Moore incident. As to McKee’s argument that Paris came to the court without clean hands, the appellate court said that it agreed with the trial court that, at worst, Paris negligently exceeded the weight limits in the FCE lifting restrictions, but that such conduct did not amount to the kind of “unconscientious, inequitable, or immoral conduct” that would warrant invocation of the doctrine of unclean hands.
In as much as there was no new injury or an aggravation of her existing condition, Paris was entitled to statutory medical benefits, attorney fees, and costs.