KY Widow Awarded Benefits For Husband's Death More than 10 Years After Injury
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, affirming an earlier decision by the state's Court of Appeals, held a widow was entitled to statutory income benefits under KRS 342.750(1)(a), in spite of the fact that her husband's death occurred ten years after the original injury–he died from complications following surgery to address his work-related condition–but the Court also held the Estate was not entitled to the $50,000 lump-sum death benefit KRS 342.750(6), since the decedent died more then four years after the original injury [Calloway Cty. Sheriff's Dep't v. Woodall, 2020 Ky. LEXIS 300 (Sept. 24, 2020). The Court also held the statute's four-year limitation did not amount to an unconstitutional special law.
Background
Spillman was working for the Calloway County Sheriff's Department ("the Department") on March 4, 2007, when he was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident. He was awarded 425 weeks of PPD benefits for his injuries. In January 2017, Spillman underwent surgery for his work-related injury. Unfortunately, he developed a pulmonary embolism following surgery and died on January 17, 2017. Subsequently, Spillman's widow sought income benefits pursuant to KRS 342.750(1)(a), while Spillman's estate sought a $50,000 lump-sum benefit under KRS 342.750(6).
The ALJ denied all benefits, finding that they were time barred, and dismissed the claims. The Board found that the widow was eligible for the surviving spouse income benefits under KRS 342.750(1)(a), but that the Estate was not entitled to the lump-sum death benefit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board on both issues. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Parties' Contentions
The Department argued that the widow could not claim death benefits after the Spillman's 425 weeks of PPD benefits have been paid in full. The Department also argued that in order for the widow to receive death benefits, the award would have to be reopened in order to increase the initial award from PPD to a death claim. The Department asserted that KRS 342.125(3), as amended in 2018, was retroactive in operation and prohibited reopening the award if more than four years had elapsed since the initial award. The widow contended that the 2018 amendment to KRS 342.125(3) regarding reopening claims was not retroactive, but that if it is, retroactivity was unconstitutional as applied in this case.
Supreme Court: Reopening is Not Applicable to Case
The Court initially held that reopening did not apply to the case, since the widow was entitled to assert her claim for death benefits independent of her husband's workers' compensation claim (citing Family Dollar v. Baytos, 525 S.W.3d 65, 72 (Ky. 2017).
Widow's Claim was not Time-Barred
The Court noted that KRS 342.750(1)(a) contained no temporal limitation. While the statute did contain a four-year limitation with regard to the $50,000 lump sum payment, that limitation period did not apply to the widow's separate claim for death benefits. The Court added that Baytos made it clear that there was no temporal limitation whatsoever on the recovery of death benefits under the statute. The plain language of KRS 342.750(1)(a) imposed no temporal limitation on benefits available, and the Court declined to read one into it. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding regarding benefits.
Equal Protection Argument Regarding $50,000 Lump Sum Benefit
Essentially, the Estate argued that the time limitation (four years) for the payment of the lump sum benefit under KRS 342.750(6) violated both the state and federal constitutions' guarantee of equal protection and violated the Kentucky Constitution's prohibition against special legislation. The widow argued that the time restriction in KRS 342.750(6) treats the estates of injured workers who die more than four years after their injuries differently than it treats the estates of workers who die within four years after their injuries, without a rational basis for doing so. The high court noted that the Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It held instead that the time limitation served to bar stale claims, providing stability and foreseeability to claimants and employers alike, thereby promoting the overall viability of the workers' compensation system.
Court Moves Away from 65-Year Precedent
As to the prohibition on special legislation, the Court acknowledged that for more than 65 years it had seen fit to apply the test set out in Schoo v. Rose, 270 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1954), which stated that in order for a law to be general in its constitutional sense it must meet the following requirements: (1) it must apply equally to all in a class, and (2) there must be distinctive and natural reasons inducing and supporting the classification.
The Court said it was mindful of the doctrine of stare decisis, but noted also that the rule was not inflexible. After a lengthy discussion of the issue, the Court adopted a new "original test" doctrine. Under that doctrine, the four-year limitation was not special legislation.
Concurring Opinion
Justice Keller concurred fully with regard to the Court's analysis and holdings regarding the widow's income benefits under KRS 342.750(1)(a) and the estate's equal protection claim as to lump-sum benefits under KRS 342.750(6). The Justice wrote separately, however, to register the justice's strong disapproval of the Court's decision to purge sixty-five years of jurisprudence in this area.