Las Vegas Police Officer's Injuries During Commute Home Were Compensable

Adopting a "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to determine whether a police officer's injury fell within the so-called "law-enforcement" exception to the standard going and coming rule, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed a state appeals officer's decision that had barred the injury claim of an officer who had been released by his sergeant to travel home on his personal motorcycle before the end of his shift [Cannon Cochran Mgmt. Servs. v. Figueroa, 2020 Nev. LEXIS 46 (July 30, 2020)]. Observing that the officer was still on the clock, and that he had been told by his sergeant to get more "seat time" on the motorcycle because he would be returning to traffic duty (which required that he utilize a motorcycle), the Court found the injuries arose out of and in the course of the officer's employment.

Background

Figueroa worked as a police officer with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD). Absent from work for an extended period of time due to injury, Figueroa was assigned to a re-acclimation program, where he performed his duties using a standard patrol car. Upon completion of the re-acclimation program, however, Figueroa was set to resume his duties as a traffic officer, which mandated his riding a motorcycle.

On the day of his injury, Figueroa was scheduled to work until 12:30 a.m., when his sergeant informed him at 11:45 p.m. that he could leave early for the day. Although he would still be paid for the remainder of his shift, Figueroa was allowed to start his commute home earlier than normal. Figueroa rode his personal motorcycle to work that day, and his sergeant instructed him to get some "seat time" on his way home. "Seat time," within this context, meant additional "practice" time on his motorcycle, since he would soon be returning to traffic duty. Other evidence tended to show that Figueroa's sergeant also told him to stay close to his phone in case they tried to contact him. Additionally, although he was given an early out for the day, because Figueroa was still "on the clock" and getting paid, he was required to abide by LVMPD's employment policies, such as refraining from consuming alcohol.

Five minutes before Figueroa's shift was originally scheduled to end and when Figueroa was approximately a mile and a half from the police station, he was struck by another vehicle. Figueroa was placed in a medically induced coma for six days given the severity of his injuries. Following this accident, Figueroa was unable to work for approximately a year and a half.

Figueroa filed a workers' compensation claim for the injuries he sustained in the accident. Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. denied the claim, and Figueroa appealed the decision. The appeals officer likewise denied Figueroa's claim, concluding Figueroa's injury did not arise out of and in the course and scope of his employment. In reaching this decision, the appeals officer determined that at the time of the accident, Figueroa was not performing his job duties as a police officer, was on his commute home, and was riding his personal motorcycle, such that no exception to the general rule excluding compensation while going to or from work applied. The district court granted Figueroa's petition, concluding that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment.

Supreme Court's Decision

The Supreme Court acknowledged that under the standard going and coming rule, there is no compensation for injuries sustained traveling to or from work. It noted that there were exceptions to the rule. For example, under the "distinct-benefit" exception, an employee might still be in the course of employment when going or coming if the employee's travel conferred a distinct benefit upon the employer. The Court added that another exception — the "law-enforcement" exception — recognized that law-enforcement officers generally possess a responsibility to enforce the law while traveling on public roads, so the injuries they sustain while traveling may be compensated.

The Court stressed that the distinct-benefit exception applied only to non-law-enforcement employees, while the law-enforcement exception was reserved for law-enforcement officers. Whether a law-enforcement officer conferred a benefit upon his employer was a circumstance the Court could take into account in considering whether the law-enforcement exception applied. However, whether or not a law-enforcement officer conferred such a benefit, it was not an exception unto its own. Quoting Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, current § 14.05, the Court added that law enforcement was a "specialized industry" and police officers are "on call in a special sense."

Officer Was Still Under Employer's Control

Applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test to Figueroa's accident, the Court said it was clear that he qualified for the law-enforcement exception. At the time of the accident, Figueroa was still on the clock — a fact that did not alone render Figueroa's claim compensable — but it was one relevant circumstance to be taken into account. Because Figueroa still had time remaining on his shift, he was unable to consume any alcohol pursuant to LVMPD's employment policies. That fact illustrated LVMPD was still exerting a certain degree of control over Figueroa at the time of his accident, supporting the conclusion that he was within the course and scope of his employment. Finally, at the time of the accident, Figueroa was fulfilling his sergeant's order to get "seat time." As a result, Figueroa was not fully discharged from all of his responsibilities for the day. Instead, this circumstance illustrated Figueroa was performing a work assignment and was still under the control of his employer.