New York Mother's Intentional Tort Action Against Farm Owner Barred
A New York appellate court affirmed a decision of a state trial court that had granted summary judgment to a defendant/farm owner who had been sued by the mother of a 14-year-old who died in an unwitnessed incident while operating a skid steer at a New York farm [Smith v Park, 2020 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3667 (3d Dept. June 25, 2020)]. In relevant part, the mother contended the defendant had engaged in criminal conduct that was related to decedent’s employment and led to his death. The appellate court noted that the state’s Workers’ Compensation Board had already determined that the minor’s injuries were suffered accidentally and in the course of the 14-year-old’s employment at the farm. Accordingly, plaintiff’s civil action against the defendant was barred both by exclusivity and by res judicata.
Background
In July 2015, 14-year-old Alex K. Smith (“decedent”) died in an unwitnessed incident while operating a skid steer owned by the Park Family Farm (“the Farm”). Plaintiff, decedent’s mother, sought workers’ compensation death benefits in 2016, and the claim was established for an accidental injury. The Workers’ Compensation Board ultimately determined that the Farm was illegally employing the minor decedent and that it had workers’ compensation insurance coverage at the time of his demise. The Board further directed that an increased death benefit [see N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 14-a] be paid as a result of the illegal employment and that the Farm bear the cost of the excess amount. That finding was ultimately affirmed on appeal [Matter of Smith v. Park, 161 A.D.3d 1426 (3d Dept. 2018)].
Plaintiff filed this separate action in 2017, seeking damages both as an individual and as administrator of decedent’s estate, for decedent’s death. Relevant here is the eighth cause of action alleging that defendant Luke M. Park — a partner in the Farm — had engaged in criminal conduct that was related to decedent’s employment and led to his death. The trial court granted Park’s summary judgment motion and dismissed the complaint, finding that workers’ compensation benefits were plaintiff’s exclusive remedy pursuant to N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 11.
Appellate Court Reasoning
The Third Department court affirmed. The nature of decedent’s injuries had already been determined in the earlier litigation, held the appellate court. The Board had found decedent’s injuries were suffered accidentally and in the course of the employment. Accordingly, plaintiff could not maintain a claim for intentional injury against defendant. Both the exclusivity doctrine and res judicata barred her claim.
The appellate court added that even if the Board’s earlier decision did not have preclusive effect, the trial court properly rejected the contention that Park had engaged in deliberate acts to injure decedent so as to bring the case within an exception to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law.
Defendant Had No Knowledge of Minor’s Use of Skid Steer
The court continued that the record reflected that decedent used the skid steer without anyone’s knowledge and that, following the investigation into decedent’s death, Park pleaded guilty to willful failure to pay unemployment insurance contributions (see N.Y. Labor Law § 633), endangering the welfare of a child (see N.Y. Penal Law § 260.10) and prohibited employment of a minor (see N.Y. Labor Law § 133). The court said that it could be inferred from those facts that Park was negligent in failing to supervise decedent, or even reckless in exposing decedent to dangerous work that his age left him unsuited for, but not that Park acted out of a “willful intent to harm” decedent, as required to support the exception to exclusivity.
The court added that in connection with the summary judgment motion, Park further denied harboring the requisite intent, averring that he viewed decedent as a son, tried to protect decedent from the dangerous aspects of farm work and never had, or would have, allowed decedent to use the skid steer. According to the appellate court, plaintiff did not raise a material question of fact in response and, thus, the trial court properly granted defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment.