Utah Court Agrees that Leap from Truck Was Unusual
In another case involving Utah's so-called "Allen standard," under which an employee with a preexisting condition faces a heightened standard for proving legal causation, a state appellate court affirmed a state Commission's order awarding workers' compensation benefits to a truck driver who sustained aggravated injuries to her knee when she jumped out of the cabin of her truck under under exigent circumstances [JBS USA v. Labor Comm'n, 2020 UT App 86, 2020 Utah App. LEXIS 89 (June 4, 2020)]. One is left to wonder if the employer's assessment of fault was perhaps an underlying factor in its aggressive defense of the case.
Background
Foster, a professional truck driver with 22 years of experience, began working for JBS in early August 2018. She came to her new employment with preexisting conditions in her right knee and lower back. On August 19, 2018, Foster was driving a semi-truck on a freeway in San Bernardino County, California, when she noticed an unusual odor, "like something burning."
She pulled over and was about to call JBS to report a mechanical issue when she heard "a loud explosion" coming from what appeared to be the front passenger's side of the vehicle. Foster later testified that she immediately feared that the truck would explode, so she exited "as fast as possible," jumping approximately 40 inches to the ground, and landing on the ground with both feet. This deviated substantially from her usual method of exiting the truck.
Out of the vehicle, Foster ventured to the passenger side of the cab and found that one of the tires had blown out and was on fire. Because Foster knew that there were two 75-gallon fuel tanks under the hood on each side of the truck, she distanced herself from the burning vehicle and called 911, then JBS. By the time firefighters arrived, the fire had spread throughout the truck, destroying the vehicle and its contents.
Employment Terminated – Notice of Injuries
Two days later, JBS concluded that the fire was the result of Foster's improper use of braking equipment and terminated her employment. Four days later, Foster provided JBS with a written statement describing the incident. In it, she stated that although she did not feel pain immediately after jumping and running away from the truck, she had since developed pain in her legs and back.
Foster subsequently sought workers' compensation benefits. An ALJ held a hearing and ultimately issued an order granting workers' compensation benefits to Foster. The Commission affirmed, adopting the ALJ's findings of fact. Regarding legal causation, the Commission held that "Foster's work activity under calmer conditions may not have involved an unusual exertion …. [H]owever, when considering the dangerous and exigent circumstances in this case, … Foster's work activity involved an unusual exertion." JBS appealed.
Accidental Injury Arising Out of and in Course of Employment
Initially, the appellate court observed that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(1), in order to be compensated for an injury, an employee must establish that:
- The injury was the result of an accident, and
- There was "a causal connection between the injury and the employment."
Medical and Legal Causation – the Allen Standard
Here, it was undisputed that Foster's injury was the result of a workplace accident. To satisfy the second element, an employee must show that the accident was both the medical and legal cause of her injury. When an employee's preexisting condition causally contributed to the workplace injury, the employee must meet a heightened standard of legal causation established in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)(the Allen standard). Courts have said that this heightened standard is necessary to distinguish those injuries that coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition results in symptoms which appear during work hours without any enhancement from the workplace.
Employer's Contentions
JBS contended, in relevant part, that Fisher's testimony differed from the report she had initially given the firefighters upon their arrival. In her testimony, Fisher said she smelled something burning and heard an explosion before exiting the truck cab, whereas the firefighter's report indicated she did not hear an explosion until after she had fled the truck cab. The court agreed with the Commission that such a discrepancy was minor and it was within the ALJ and Commission's discretion to weigh Fisher's credibility.
Heightened Standard for Preexisting Conditions
As to the heightened standard of proof required in the case, the appellate court stressed that what was at issue was whether Foster's action in jumping from the truck, taking the totality of these circumstances into consideration, was unusual — that is, one that was not "generally expected of people in today's society." The court concluded that it was.
JBS asserted that Foster's action was similar to the everyday activity of "jumping down from a truck bed or from a low wall." He court disagreed. The court stressed that Foster did not merely jump down from the cabin of the truck. The Commission specifically found that Foster jumped away from the truck. More importantly, the exigent circumstances surrounding the jump caused Foster to hurry and prevented her from taking the precautionary measures not to land awkwardly. The appellate court concluded, therefore, that Foster's jump constituted an unusual exertion that readily satisfied the heightened legal cause standard required for individuals with preexisting conditions.
Comment: What Else is Going on Here
I'm not all that good with math. Sometimes I can take "two plus two" and come up with "five," but I'm left wondering what else is really going on in this case. By that I'm wondering if this is one of those cases in which the employer makes an early assessment that the employee is at fault — here Fisher was fired two days after the accident for improper use of brakes — digs its heels in, and fights the workers' compensation claim every step of the way in spite of the fact that fault is not supposed to be an issue.
Consider the Oceguera decision that I wrote about here just a few days ago. There, the employer argued that the action of an employee's foot slipping off a sewing machine pedal was not such a departure from the ordinary to satisfy the Allen standard. That's a much closer case favoring the employer, at least from my viewpoint. Here, one has a tire that catches fire, one or more "explosions" occur within close proximity of fuel tanks, and, in the end, a fire-charred vehicle. Can anyone with a straight face argue that getting out of such a vehicle is an ordinary occurrence for members of the public at large?
And so, we turn back to the firing. If I'm off base, I'll gladly admit my error. I wonder, however, if the alleged improper use of the brakes, which may have caused an expensive loss for the employer, is the motivating factor here.