SC Supreme Court Says Deceased Worker’s “Girlfriend” Failed to Show Dependency

Reversing a decision of the state’s Court of Appeals, and side-stepping — at least to some degree — the issue of illicit relationships, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found that the “girlfriend” of a deceased worker had failed to show that she relied on the decedent for the “reasonable necessities of life.” Accordingly, she could not recover workers’ compensation death benefits under the state’s Workers’ Compensation Act [York v. Longlands Plantation, 2020 S.C. LEXIS 28 (Mar. 4, 2020)].

Background

Timothy York died in a work-related accident on August 26, 2013, when his boat capsized on a pond. In early 2014, Tyrone York, Timothy’s brother and the personal representative of his estate, filed a claim for death benefits seeking workers’ compensation death benefits on behalf of Timothy’s mother, Shirley York, as Timothy’s next of kin. Yvonne Burns sought benefits for herself as Timothy’s common law wife under S.C. Code Ann.§ 42-9-110 (2015); or alternatively, as a dependent under S.C. Code Ann. §§ 42-9-120 or 42-9-130 (2015).

Single Commissioner’s Decision – Illicit Relationship

The single commissioner found decedent’s mother entitled to the full sum of death benefits allowable under the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), holding also that the evidence did not support a finding that Timothy and Yvonne had a common law marriage. The single commissioner further held that although Yvonne’s financial dependency on Timothy was somewhat greater than his mother’s, such financial dependence was not determinative of the outcome of the case since, under Day v. Day, 216 S.C. 334, 58 S.E.2d 83 (1950), an individual cannot be a dependent if he or she is in an illicit relationship with the deceased. The Appellate Panel affirmed and Yvonne appealed.

Court of Appeals Decision – No Actual Evidence of Fornication

The court of appeals reversed, finding — in spite of the fact Yvonne’s initial claim was based on being the deceased’s common-law wife — that there was no evidence of fornication in the record [for a more complete discussion of the Court of Appeals decision, see my December 18, 2018 blog]. As relevant here, the decedent’s mother sought certiorari, arguing that Yvonne could not be considered a dependent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Supreme Court Opinion

As had the Court of Appeals, Justice Hearn, writing for the Supreme Court, began by noting that the Act set forth two classes of dependents who may recover death benefits: (a) those who are conclusively presumed as dependents and (b) all others who demonstrate the requisite factual showing. Because the dispute concerned Timothy’s mother and his girlfriend — according to the justice, Yvonne had abandoned her claim to be Timothy’s common-law wife — only the second category of dependency was at issue.

Turning to the issue of illicit relationships, the justice noted that in Day, the decedent’s “spouse” was denied benefits because she was legally married to another man when she married the decedent. The spouse thought her prior husband had died, when he had not, and there was no dispute that she married the decedent in good faith. Although the Court in Day indicated it had sympathy for the “spouse’s” situation, it did not believe the General Assembly intended to permit recovery for a person living in a bigamous relationship.

Justice Hearn observed that almost 40 years later, the state’s court of appeals addressed a similar situation. In Palm v. General Painting Co., 296 S.C. 41, 370 S.E.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1988), aff’d as modified on other grounds, 302 S.C. 372, 396 S.E.2d 361 (1990), a woman lived with the decedent for two years before his death while married to another man. The commission found the woman was wholly dependent on the decedent, but concluded she did not qualify as a dependent under the Act based on Day. The Court noted that if a bigamous spouse, who mistakenly believed in good faith in the validity of her marriage (the situation in Day) was barred from receiving death benefits, so also should a person who, while married to another, cohabited with one not his or her spouse with no belief that they were married.

Reasonable Necessities of Life

Acknowledging that the jurisdictions were split regarding whether unmarried cohabitants could recover death benefits, Justice Hearn pointed out that the state’s General Assembly had been silent for “the past seven decades,” i.e., since the Day decision [Opinion, pp. 4-5]. The justice side-stepped the illicit relationship issue, however, indicating that under Day, there must be something more than intermittent financial assistance; instead, the claimant must rely on the decedent “for the reasonable necessities of life [Day, 216 S.C. at 342, 58 S.E.2d at 87].

The evidence here indicated that Yvonne worked some 50 hours per week as a nurse’s aide, that Yvonne owned her house, filing her tax return as “single,” and “head of household.” Justice Hearn stressed that while the status listed on a tax return was not determinative, it carried weight. It was also clear from the evidence — including Yvonne’s own testimony — that she and Timothy had a tumultuous relationship in which she regularly kicked him out of the house because of his alcohol problem. In summary, Yvonne could not show that she relied on the decedent for the “reasonable necessities of life,” nor could she demonstrate a legal or other sufficient obligation justifying recovery. The court of appeals was accordingly reversed and Timothy’s mother was awarded death benefits as his sole dependent under the Act.