Divided Rhode Island Supreme Court Nixes Conclusive Cancer Presumptions for Firefighters

R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-19.1-1 (1956) does not create a conclusive presumption that cancer in firefighters arises out of and in the course of the employment, held a divided Supreme Court of Rhode Island Wednesday in Lang v. Municipal Employees’ Retirement System, No. 2017-295-M.P. (R.I., Dec. 18, 2019). Noting that there was no express language in the statute granting a conclusive or a rebuttable presumption that any diagnosis of cancer among firefighters is an occupational cancer, the majority of the Court stressed that in order to qualify for a disability benefit, the firefighter must prove a causal connection between the disease and his or her employment as a firefighter. That is to say, the firefighter must show that he or she has been diagnosed with “a cancer arising out of his or her employment as a fire fighter, due to injury from exposures to smoke, fumes, or carcinogenic, poisonous, toxic, or chemical substances while in the performance of active duty in the fire department” [Section 45-19.1-2(d)(emphasis added by Court)].

Background

The pertinent facts in the case were not disputed. Lang served as a firefighter for the City of Cranston from 1996 until September 2012, when he was diagnosed with colon cancer. The city placed Lang on injured-on-duty status, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-19-1, and he began receiving salary benefits while incapacitated from work. In January 2014, Lang applied for accidental disability benefits under G.L. 1956 § 45-21.2-9, based upon his cancer diagnosis. In July 2015, the Retirement Board found that he did not prove that his cancer arose out of and in the course of his employment as a firefighter, and it denied his application.

Ultimately, a trial judge issued a written decision in which she reversed the board, finding that §45-19.1-1(b) created a conclusive presumption that all cancer in firefighters under § 45-19.1-1(a) arises out of and in the course of their employment. The judge, therefore, granted Lang accidental disability retirement benefits based upon his claim of occupational cancer. The Board appealed to the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court, which affirmed the decision and decree of the trial judge. The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the Appellate Division’s decision.

Statute Defined “Occupational Cancer”

The majority of the high court stressed that the General Assembly could have determined that all or any cancers in firefighters are occupational. It had not done so, however. Instead, it specifically defined “occupational cancer” and required that a cancer be proven that arose out of his or her employment due to injury from certain exposures while in the performance of active duty as a firefighter before being entitled to an occupational cancer disability benefit. The majority added:

To hold that chapter 19.1 includes a conclusive presumption, or any presumption, would render the specific definition that the General Assembly gave to the term “occupational cancer” meaningless, as would the requirement that a firefighter be unable to perform his or her duties while in the service of the fire department because of that occupational cancer [Opinion, p. 15, emphasis added].

Legislative Findings Did not Amount to Grant of Presumption

The majority added further that the legislative findings contained in § 45-19.1-1 did not establish a conclusive presumption that every firefighter’s cancer was due to injury from exposures while in the performance of his or her duties. Rather, the legislative findings in § 45-19.1-1(a) were general statements regarding the harsh conditions that firefighters can face or often face. The majority said those general findings on the part of the Legislature were akin to “broad-brush policy observations that provide the backdrop for the remedy that § 45-19.1-3 offers when a firefighter can prove that he or she specifically has suffered from the general conditions listed in § 45-19.1-1 and has been diagnosed with occupational cancer, as defined in § 45-19.1-2(d), as a result” [Opinion, p. 16].

What About a Cigarette Smoker?

The majority offered a helpful hypothetical:

To conclude that the language in § 45-19.1-1 creates a conclusive presumption would not only render the statutory definition of occupational cancer in § 45-19.1-2(d) meaningless and create a right not found within the statute, but would also construe the statute to reach an absurd result. For example, a conclusive presumption that all cancers in firefighters are occupational cancers would mean that a firefighter who smoked four packs of cigarettes a day for decades would receive an occupational cancer disability benefit despite not having proved that his cancer was related to exposure on the job. Similarly, a conclusive presumption would provide occupational cancer benefits to a firefighter who contracted cancer as a result of exposure to pesticides while landscaping in his or her yard. We do not believe the General Assembly would have extended such broad benefits to all firefighters without expressly providing for such in clear and unambiguous language [Opinion, p. 16].

Accordingly, the majority held that chapter 19.1 of title 45 did not contain a conclusive, “or for that matter any, presumption that all cancers in firefighters are occupational cancers” [Opinion, p. 17].

Dissent

Justice Flaherty dissented in relevant part, arguing that the statute did, indeed, provide a conclusive presumption that a firefighter’s cancer arose out of and in the course of the employment.