Alabama Employer’s Actions After Injury Might Result in Tort Liability
Where an injured worker asserted claims based on additional injuries that he alleged arose from conduct that occurred following his workplace injury (he alleged, inter alia, that after he suffered a work-related severe burn injury, a co-employee sprayed him with an improper substance, refused to notify an on-side emergency response team as to the worker’s injury, refused the worker’s request to cut off his shirt, failed to call an ambulance, and delayed in taking the worker directly to a hospital), it was possible that those actions were “too tenuous” to bring the activities under the coverage of the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act [McCoy v. International Paper Co., 2019 Ala. LEXIS 136 (Dec. 6, 2019)]. Accordingly, a state trial court did not err in refusing to grant the employer’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the civil action was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Alabama Act.
Background
McCoy, an iron worker for Burkes, was working in a confined space at a mill owned by International Paper (“IP”), using welding torches to cut heavy metal places in one of IP’s machines. A worker employed by another company broke a welding line, which ignited the air. McCoy sustained severe burn injuries. According to McCoy, Burkes failed to notify IP, which had an emergency-medical-response team on site to address workplace injuries. According to McCoy, a Burkes employee sprayed an “improper substance” on McCoy to treat the burn injury and refused McCoy’s request to cut off McCoy’s shirt.
McCoy further alleged that, rather than calling an ambulance, Burkes transported McCoy by private vehicle to a local doctor’s office. The doctor advised that the injuries were too severe to be treated at his office and that McCoy needed to be taken to a hospital. A Burkes employee transported McCoy to a drugstore to purchase over-the-counter burn cream and then to Grove Hill Memorial Hospital. That hospital determined that the burns were too serious to be treated there, and, as a result, McCoy was transported by ambulance to the University of South Alabama Medical Center in Mobile, where he was hospitalized for approximately one week.
McCoy filed the instant civil action against Burkes and others, asserting claims of negligence, wantonness, and the tort of outrage against Burkes and the other defendants. McCoy’s claims against Burkes were based on his assertions that Burkes failed to furnish appropriate medical care and to provide reasonable and prompt access to qualified health-care providers after his workplace accident. Burkes sought dismissal, arguing that the civil action against it was barred by exclusivity. The trial court denied Burkes’ motion and Burkes timely filed a petition for the writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Alabama.
High Court’s Opinion
The Supreme Court acknowledged the broad scope of the exclusive remedy provisions of the Alabama Act. It indicated that for purposes of the original motion (and the appeal), McCoy’s allegations would be accepted as true. The Court reviewed a line of decisions relied upon by Burkes, but found them factually distinguishable.
Question of Fact
The Court observed that in Lowman v. Piedmont Exec. Shirt Mfg. Co., 547 So. 2d 90, (Ala. 1989), the court held the worker’s injuries were predicated, not on her workplace injury itself, but rather on the employer’s actions following the employee’s workplace injury. Citing Lowman, the Court stressed that whether McCoy’s claims related to injuries that actually arose out of his employment or whether McCoy’s claims related to activities that were “too tenuous to bring the later activities under the coverage” of the Act required a fact-intensive inquiry. The Court said that considering the allegations in McCoy’s complaint most strongly in McCoy’s favor, it had to conclude that the trial court could have determined that McCoy’s negligence and wantonness claims did not arise from “an accident proximately resulting from, and that occurred while the employee was engaged in, the actual performance of the duties of his or her employment” [quoting Ex parte Shelby Cty. Health Care Auth., 850 So. 2d 332, 338 (Ala. 2002)]. In light of such a determination, the exclusive-remedy provisions would not operate to bar McCoy’s claims for the post-accident events.