PA Supreme Court Refuses Narrow Definition of Employer’s “Premises” in Parking Lot Case
Affirming a decision of the state’s Commonwealth Court, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently held that an airline employee who was injured while riding an airport shuttle bus to an employee parking lot after her shift ended sustained compensable injuries in spite of the fact that the City of Philadelphia—and not the airline—owned both the shuttle bus and the employee parking lot [US Airways, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bockelman), 2019 Pa. LEXIS 6526 (Nov. 20, 2019). With its decision, the Court stood by its earlier Epler holding that the phrase “the employer’s premises” in Section 301(c)(1) of the state’s Workers’ Compensation Act [77 Pa. Stat. § 411(1)] should be construed liberally to include any area that is integral to the employer’s business operations, including any reasonable means of ingress to or egress from the workplace.
Background
On January 23, 2015, Claimant, a Philadelphia-based flight attendant for the employer airlines, was scheduled scheduled to work a one-day trip from Philadelphia to Miami and then back to Philadelphia. Claimant drove her personal vehicle to the Philadelphia International Airport and parked (for free) in one of two employee parking lots at the airport. The airline does not own or operate these parking lots. Instead, the City of Philadelphia Division of Aviation (“the Division”) owns, operates, and maintains the parking lots specifically for airport and airline employees.
Claimant rode the Division shuttle to the airport terminal and flew to Miami as scheduled. She then returned back in Philadelphia just before 10:00 p.m. that evening. After a brief discussion with a co-worker, Claimant left the terminal and boarded the shuttle bus to take her back to her vehicle. While lifting her suitcase onto one of the shuttle’s luggage racks, Claimant slipped in a puddle, fell backwards, and crushed her left foot.
The Slaugenhaupt Test
Utilizing the so-called Slaugenhaupt test [see W.C.A.B. (Slaugenhaupt) v. U.S. Steel Corp., 376 A.2d 271, 31 Pa. Commw. 329 (Pa. 1977), the WCJ granted Claimant’s claim petition, finding that Claimant had established each of the three requirements:
- That the injury occurs on the employer’s premises;
- The employee’s presence on the employer’s premises is required by the nature of her employment; and
- The employee’s injury was caused by the condition of the premises or by the operation of the employer’s business thereon.
The WCAB affirmed and the airline appealed, arguing that Claimant could not establish either the first or the second prong of the test, in as much as the shuttle and the parking lot were not owned or maintained by the airline.
Commonwealth Court Affirmed
In an unanimous, published opinion [US Airways, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (Bockelman), 179 A.3d 1177 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018)], the Commonwealth Court affirmed the WCJ’s findings, explaining that the first element of the Slaugenhaupt test is satisfied not only when an employee is on an employer’s premises proper, but also any areas significantly connected to an employer’s affairs, including a reasonable avenue of ingress to and egress from the workplace. As to the second requirement of the Slaugenhaupt test, the Commonwealth Court held that it had been satisfied because Claimant used the airport shuttle as a reasonable means of egress from her workplace. The airline again appealed.
Supreme Court Reasoning
Speaking for the Court, Justice Wecht stressed that the Court had earlier noted that the meaning of the phrase “the employer’s premises” in Section 301(c)(1)—and, by extension, in the Slaugenhaupt test—was not limited to property that the employer legally owned or physically controlled [Epler v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 Pa. 391, 393 A.2d 1163, 1166-67 (Pa. 1978). The Justice acknowledged the airline’s argument—that Epler was distinguishable given that, unlike the employer in Epler, the airline did not instruct employees where to park, issue parking permits, or discipline employees for parking in restricted areas.
Justice Wecht added that the airline was correct that “a handful of Commonwealth Court decisions” had read the high court’s decision in Epler narrowly. Such a reading was wrong, said the Justice. The justice chided, “Epler revisionism has led to the mistaken belief that a parking area cannot be integral to an employer’s premises if workers are given a choice whether or not to use it” [Opinion, pp. 17-18]. Worse, said the justice, two of the Commonwealth Court decisions construing Epler had incorrectly suggested that an injury does not occur on “the employer’s premises” unless the employer owns or controls the area in question. The justice stressed that Epler made it clear that an area may constitute part of an employer’s premises even if the employer does not own or control it. The critical factor is not the employer’s title to or control over the area, but rather the fact that the employer had caused the area to be used by its employees in performance of their assigned tasks.
The justice concluded that both the Commonwealth Court, the Appeal Board, and the WCJ had correctly concluded that the lot in which Claimant parked her vehicle was integral to the airlines’ business operations. The Commonwealth Court’s decision was, therefore, affirmed.