Maryland First Responder’s Degenerative Knee Condition is Occupational “Disease”

In a divided decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland yesterday held that since there was no showing that a first responder had a concomitant preexisting condition, and since he had engaged in repetitive activities over his 24 years of employment, his degenerative meniscal tears could be considered an occupational disease as a matter of law, and there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that the responder’s degenerative meniscal tears were compensable [Baltimore County v. Quinlan, 2019 Md. LEXIS 439 (August 26, 2019)]. Quoting Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 52.03[1], the majority held the first responder had proven the elements spelled out in Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. (1991, 2016 Repl. Vol.), § 9-502(d).

Background

In October 2015, Quinlan filed a claim with the Commission asserting that he developed meniscal tears in his right knee due to his job duties as a paramedic/firefighter for Baltimore County. Ultimately, the Commission disallowed the claim, concluding that Quinlan had not sustained an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of the employment.

Quinlan sought review in the Circuit Court, requesting a jury trial. Prior to trial, the County filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Quinlan failed to present evidence that his knee injury was an occupational disease or that it was related to the nature of his employment as a paramedic. The judge denied the motion, finding that there was a material dispute of fact. At the trial, the parties offered conflicting medical evidence. Quinlan’s expert testified that there was literature to suggest that firefighters and/or EMT positions had higher rates of both meniscus tears and of arthritis, as opposed to persons performing less physically demanding jobs.

Jury Verdict Favored Quinlan

The jury returned a verdict for Quinlan, stating that he had sustained an occupational disease of right knee degenerative tears arising out of and in the course of the employment. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed and the Maryland high court granted the County’s petition for writ of certiorari.

Majority Opinion

Quoting Larson, the majority first observed:

Definitions of “occupational disease” should always be checked against the purpose for which they were uttered [Larson, § 52.03[1]].

The majority noted that parties’ principal disagreement centered around whether degenerative meniscal tears were both (a) “caused” by Quinlan’s occupation as a paramedic and (b) “due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist” [LE § 9-502(d)]. The majority indicated the first of the two questions had been established as a finding of fact. The crux of the case, therefore, boiled down to the second query: the degree to which, and how, the occupational injury must be “due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist.” That is to say, from the County’s viewpoint, Quinlan’s condition was an “ordinary disease of life.”

Ordinary Disease of Life”

Again, quoting Larson, the majority said:

The conditions of employment which distinguish occupational diseases from ordinary diseases of life need not be unusual chemicals, fumes, and the like. They may be distinctive because familiar harmful events are present in unusual degree [§ 52.03[3][b]].

The majority also stressed that in the wording of LE § 9-502(d), the General Assembly required hazards to be in the “nature” of the occupation, not unique to it. Thus, the fact that people in ordinary life also developed degenerative knee tears was not a dispositive factor. The majority concluded that the record contained evidence that the nature of the job of a paramedic/firefighter placed one at a greater risk for degenerative knee conditions. Quinlan engaged in the activities for more than 24 years. Moreover, there was evidence that the employment actually caused the tears. With this in mind, the jury could reasonably find Quinlan had sustained a compensable occupational disease.

Dissent

Judge Getty dissented, asserting that Quinlan had failed to prove that his disability was distinctly associated with his occupation. Judge Getty cautioned, “I am concerned that Mr. Quinlan, and future litigants under similar unclear medical claims, will bootstrap additional conditions under the same claim and encompass the additional condition within an occupational disease.” The Judge added that he was concerned that the majority’s decision, combined with another recent decision, permitted a broad range of coverage where employees engaged in activity common to many occupations as long as the occupation increased the risk of contracting a disease.