Iowa In-Home Nurse’s Injuries in Head-On Collision Compensable in Spite of Slight Deviation From Routine

Sufficient evidence existed in the record to support the commissioner’s (and the district court’s) determination that a nurse, who worked for the employer providing in-home nursing services to patients, sustained compensable, work-related injuries in a head-on collision as she traveled to her first patient’s home on the relevant day in question, held the Court of Appeals of Iowa in Carroll Area Nursing Servs. v. Malloy, 2019 Iowa App. LEXIS 663 (July 24, 2019). That the nurse took a slightly longer route to see the patient, based on her need to pick up her own vehicle that contained nursing materials and supplies, which was located at her mother’s house—she and her mother had driven her mother’s vehicle to Omaha earlier in the day for an unrelated medical appointment—was not a sufficient deviation so as to take her travel to the patient’s home out of the course and scope of the employment.

Background

Malloy, a registered nurse, provided nursing services, typically in the patient’s home, traveling to her various assignments in her private vehicle. Her mileage was tracked by a GPS unit that apparently could be moved from vehicle to vehicle as necessary. On the day of the accident, Malloy had arranged to be off during the morning in order that she could attend a medical appointment in Omaha. She drove her vehicle to the home of her mother, which was two miles north of her own home, and left her personal vehicle there. Malloy and her mother drove to Omaha in her mother’s car.

On Malloy’s way back from Omaha, she received a call from a health care aide about one of Malloy’s patients, Patient A. Malloy talked to Patient A and told him that she would see him that day. Deborah’s mother took Malloy to Malloy’s house, where she changed into her work uniform. Her mother then drove Malloy to her mother’s house in order that Malloy could pick up her car, which contained the medical supplies she needed for her work. Malloy decided to go to Patient A’s house first, before her other appointments. As Malloy was traveling in her vehicle in the direction of Patient A’s house, she was involved in a head-on collision and sustained serious injuries.

Commission and District Court Decisions

A deputy workers’ compensation commissioner found Malloy came within the personal-vehicle exception to the coming-and-going rule, and her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. The deputy also found Malloy had not deviated from the course of her employment at the time of the accident. The deputy determined Malloy was entitled to a running award of healing period benefits. The deputy’s decision was affirmed by the workers' compensation commissioner. The district court found that there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s findings.

Personal Vehicle Exception to Going and Coming Rule

Acknowledging that, in general, workers’ compensation benefits are not provided for injuries sustained off the employment premises, on the way to or from work, the appellate court noted that an exception provided for coverage where the employee is required, as part of his or her employment, to provide a vehicle for his or her use during the working day. Quoting Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, the appellate court said the reason for the exception was because the obligation to provide the private vehicle compels “the employee to submit to the hazards associated with private motor travel, which otherwise he or she would have the option of avoiding.” The appellate court found that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s conclusion the present circumstances came within the personal-vehicle exception to the coming-and-going rule.

Deviation

Alternatively, the employer contended Malloy was in the midst of a personal deviation at the time of the accident. It argued that Malloy’s house was two miles south of her mother’s house and that Malloy had not returned to a point parallel to her own home when the accident occurred.

The court observed that whether or not the employee was on a personal frolic at the time of the injury was a question of fact for the commissioner and that the commissioner’s finding was binding on the appellate court. The court indicated that both the deputy commissioner and the commissioner had determined that Malloy had resumed an activity or duty connected with her employment when she began driving toward her patient's home. The appellate court agreed. When Malloy left her mother’s home, she was in her work uniform, with her work supplies in her car, traveling toward Patient A’s home. At the time of the accident, Malloy was engaged in the work she was required to do—traveling to patients homes to provide medical services. The court, therefore, affirmed the decision of the district court and the workers’ compensation commissioner.