Oregon Court Resolves Statutory Dilemma Between Conflicting Statutes of Limitation
Faced with a direct conflict between two statutes of limitation, the first [ORS 30.275(9)] indicating that “notwithstanding any other … statute providing a limitation on the commencement of an action,” a tort action against a public body must be filed within two years after the alleged loss or injury, and the second [ORS 656.019(2)(a)] indicating that “notwithstanding any other statute of limitation,” a claim against an employer—including a public employer—must be filed within 180 days after an unsuccessful workers’ compensation claim against the public employer has become final, even if that is more than two years after the alleged loss or injury, an Oregon appellate court held the second statute was dominant where a public school district employee filed her complaint within 180 days of the Workers’ Compensation Board’s denial of her claim, but more than two years from the date of her injury [Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 287, 298 Ore. App. 357, 2019 Ore. App. LEXIS 848 (June 26, 2019)].
ORS 656.019 Was Reaction to Smothers Decision
The court noted that ORS 656.019 had been enacted in 2001, as a response to Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Ore. 83, 23 P3d 333 (2001), overruled by Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Ore. 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016). At issue in Smothers was the constitutionality of a provision of the workers’ compensation statutes declaring that an injured worker’s exclusive remedy for on-the-job injuries lay in the administrative workers’ compensation system. The court held that, because the workers’ compensation statutes imposed a heightened causation standard beyond what common-law negligence required, the exclusive remedy requirement deprived workers of a right to that common-law remedy, in violation of the remedy guarantee of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution.
Responding to Smothers, the legislature enacted ORS 656.019. Section (1) of the law provides that the exclusive remedy requirement no longer applies if a claim is not compensable because of the heightened causation requirement under the workers’ compensation law. If a worker’s claim has been denied because of a failure to satisfy that causation standard, the law provides that the worker may “pursue a civil negligence action” for that work-related injury. Section (2) then provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any other statute of limitation provided in law,” such a civil negligence action must be commenced within the later of either two years from the date of the worker’s injury or 180 days from the date of the order denying the workers’ compensation claim.
More Specific Statute Usually Controls
The court continued that in dealing with direct conflict between statutes, courts had utilized several mechanisms. Generally speaking, courts tended to favor the more specific of the two conflicting statutes. The court said in the instant case, ORS 656.019(2)(a) was the more specific. ORS 30.275(9) applied to any claim asserted against a public body, whereas ORS 656.019(2)(a) applied only to workers’ compensation claims. Moreover, ORS 656.019(2)(a) applies only to a specific type of workers’ compensation claim—one that had been denied because of the claimant’s failure to satisfy the statutory major contributing cause standard. Thus, the longer limitation period of ORS 656.019(2)(a) should take precedence over the short one found in ORS 30.275(9).
Later Statute Usually Controls
The court added that another mechanism was to resolve the conflict based on the most recently enacted statute. Here, ORS 656.019(2)(a) had been enacted some 20 years later than ORS 30.275(9). That mechanism accordingly also favored the use of ORS 656.019(2)(a).
Trial Court’s Order Dismissing Complaint Reversed
Based on the foregoing, the appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.